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Baar v. Tigerman: An Attack on Absolute
Immunity for Arbitrators!
INTRODUCTION
An influential and potentially far reaching case decided by a Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal ultimately may have great impact on arbi-
tration in the state of California and possibly in other jurisdictions
as well.' Traditionally, arbitrators have been granted an immunity
similar to the absolute judicial immunity given to judges in the deci-
sionmaking process; they have not been held personally liable for
acts and conduct associated with arbitration proceedings.2 In con-
trast, the second district appellate court in Baar v. Tigerman denied
such arbitral immunity to an arbitrator who failed to make a timely
award, and permitted a cause of action in breach of contract di-
rectly against him.3
No California court had addressed the problem of arbitral immu-
nity until Baar v. Tigerman, and the decision represents a signifi-
cant inroad into the doctrine of automatic immunity for
arbitrators.4 Essentially, blanket protection for an arbitrator's mis-
conduct was rejected and a court must now examine the factual
context out of which the claim arose. If the alleged wrongful acts
by the arbitrator are sufficiently remote from the decisionmaking
process, arbitral immunity may not be automatically granted. After
Baar, other disgruntled parties to arbitration are likely to pursue
their grievances against arbitrators and other courts will be asked to
decide similar issues. Therefore, this Note will examine whether
the denial of automatic immunity for all conduct related to the arbi-
tration proceeding will necessarily be a burden on the process, and
whether the denial will promote the essential integrity of arbitration
and consequently help to preserve it as a successful and useful alter-
1. Only a few state jurisdictions have had occasion to rule on arbitral immunity.
See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
2. Domke, The Arbitrator's Immunity From Liability. A Comparative Survey, 3
U. TOL. L. REV. 99 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Domke, Arbitrator's Immunity]. See
infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
3. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (1983).
A hearing was denied by the California Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision. The trial
court sustained defendant's demurrer and granted dismissal of the suit based on the
doctrine of arbitral immunity. In reversing, the court of appeals stated: "a cause of
action at the least was stated in breach of contract .... " Presumably, the trial court
would now decide whether the other causes of action listed were applicable. See infra
note 103.
4. Id.
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native method of conflict resolution.5
The focus of this Note is arbitral immunity in the context of com-
mercial arbitration and the attendant procedure; however, applica-
tion of the doctrine is not necessarily limited to such private
contractual agreements. 6 As will be demonstrated, dissatisfied
plaintiffs have also tried to sue arbitrators personally in labor arbi-
trations,7 New York Stock Exchange arbitrations 8 and in judicially
mandated arbitrations. 9
Since arbitration has specifically been identified as a desirable al-
ternative solution to the congestion of the courts and is likely to
gain even more in favor,10 the Baar decision may have wide ranging
influence not only in California, but also on the concept of arbitral
immunity in other jurisdictions. This Note will analyze the case in
the context of its particular fact pattern, and in its relationship to
existing California law. It will also reflect upon the ramifications of
the decision with respect to the broader context of public policy."
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF ARBITRATION
A. Historical Background
Arbitration is a voluntary, private method of settling disputes
without making use of the court system.12 Early accounts indicate
that arbitration was used in Iceland to settle bloody feuds, in
Greece to decide disputes between towns and by the Yurok Indians,
who brought in non-relatives from outside their community to help
settle conflicts.' 3  Arbitration was commonly used in medieval
5. See infra notes 91-98, 149-55 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 26 and 32.
7. See Calzarano v. Liebowitz, 550 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), infra note 81.
See also Delta Lines, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 66 Cal. App. 3d 960, 136
Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
8. Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982). See infra
notes 84-87 and accompanying text. See Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir.
1977), infra note 81.
9. See Raitport v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 451 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1978), infra
note 81. See also CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1141.10-1141.32 (West 1982), infra note 33.
10. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Burger, Better Way]. This article is a reprint of Chief Justice Burger's annual address to
the ABA Convention in 1982. Briefly, because of an overload in the court system arbi-
tration has lately been accorded attention with renewed vigor as a way to relieve the
burden on the conventional litigation process. See infra notes 91-94. See also Hiltzik,
Cures for Caseload Crisis Prove Elusive, L.A. Times, Feb. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 4 (Chief
Justice Burger again reiterates the problems in civil litigation in his annual speech to the
ABA Convention).
11. See infra notes 91-98, 149-55 and accompanying text.
12. M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01.1 (G. Wilner ed. 1968 &
Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION].
13. E. TEPLE & R. MOBERLEY, ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1-2
(1979).
1985]
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Spain, in North Africa and in Germany. When the Romans barred
the Jews from their civil courts, the Jews resorted to a clandestine
private system of arbitration.1 4 Even Paul exhorted the early Chris-
tians to avoid the courts and submit their disputes to private
settlement. 15
The Merchant Guilds in England had a particularly well devel-
oped and traditional method for settling conflicts amongst them-
selves, although the procedures lacked the characteristics that
arbitration has now.' 6 Yet, early common law courts developed a
hostility to arbitration, because the common law judges viewed ar-
bitration as a threat to their social power and prestige and they
feared the loss of income. 17 Furthermore, modem courts only re-
luctantly recognized agreements to arbitrate and such agreements
were deemed revocable at will.' 8 The last fifty to seventy-five years
have finally brought both statutory and judicially recognized
changes to arbitration' 9 along with an almost universal recognition
of its value as a viable alternative to civil litigation. 20
B. Modern Practices in Arbitration
Presently, trade and business associations, chambers of com-
merce, labor unions and other institutions have developed various
rules, procedures, and methods for the arbitration process. By tai-
loring these regulations to the specific needs and criteria of particu-
lar business or industry practices, it is easier to provide convenient,
knowledgeable and efficient resolution to disputes.2'
Additionally, the American Arbitration Association emerged in
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. Paul wrote to the early Christians in Corinth: "When any of you have a
grievance against another aren't you ashamed to bring the matter to be settled before a
pagan court instead of before the Church?. . . Are you really unable to find among
your number one man with enough sense to decide a dispute between one and another
of you, or must one brother resort to the law against another and that before those who
have not faith in Christ?" 1 Corinth 6:1-5 (The New Testament in Modem English).
16. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.
REV. 132, 137-38 (1934) (Since traders and merchants traveled it is possible that the
common law courts simply had no jurisdiction and so the method outside the courts
developed as an alternative).
17. Id. at 141-43.
18. Id. at 138-40.
19. See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
20. See generally Domke, Arbitrator's Immunity, supra note 2. See supra note 10
and infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
21. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 12, § 2.01.
The very refinements and complexities of our court machinery often make it
cumbersome and dilatory when applied to controversies involving simple is-
sues of fact or law. This is especially true in the case when the issue of fact
turns upon expert knowledge as to the nature or quality of merchandise or the
damage consequent upon the failure to perform a contract for its delivery. ..
which can be better determined by a layman having training and experience in
[Vol. 21
3
Olesen: Baar v. Tigerman: An Attack on Absolute Immunity for Arbitrators!
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
1985] BAAR V TIGERMAN
1926 as a nonprofit organization which is independent of any par-
ticular industry trade or interest group. 22 It administers arbitra-
tions, maintains panels of experts and has developed rules and
procedures especially suitable for each specialty and area of
expertise.23
Typically, parties write an arbitration clause into their contract
specifying various appropriate methods by which they wish to arbi-
trate, one of which may be to direct the American Arbitration As-
sociation to facilitate the proceeding. 24 The Association will
provide the list from which parties select an arbitrator; he or she
may be paid depending on the type, length, and complexity of the
proceeding. 25 Neither the arbitrator nor the Association would
have any power over the parties unless they have agreed to submit
a particular trade or business than by a judge and jury who have not had that
training and experience.
Id. (quoting Harlan F. Stone, 10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLTCAL SCI-
ENCE 197 (1923)).
22. Id. § 2.02.
23. See generally AAA General Counsel's Annual Report, Arbitration & the Law,
1982 (an overview of the range of activities of the American Arbitration Association).
See also AAA, Modern Dispute Settlement Through the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. (The AAA has developed special procedures that are adapted to business, to the
construction industry, to labor and even to Intenational Trade for just several
examples.)
24. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules (1982) [here-
inafter cited as AAA, Rules]. The Association provides a sample contract clause that
can be used to incorporate their rules. Parties can also write their own provisions as
they may wish. The suggested language of the Association Clause for inclusion in a
contract reads:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commer-
cial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment
upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court
having jurisdiction thereof.
Id.
For submission to arbitration of existing disputes for which parties did not previously
have an agreement to arbitrate:
We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to submit to arbitration under the
commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Abitration Association the fol-
lowing controversy: (cite briefly). We further agree that the above contro-
versy be submitted to (one) (three) Arbitrator(s) selected from the panels of
Arbitrators agree that we will faithfully observe this agreement and the Rules
and that we will abide by and perform any award rendered by the Arbitra-
tor(s) and that a judgment of the Court having jurisdiction may be entered
upon the award.Id.
25. See AAA, Rules, supra note 24, No. 51 which provides in part:
In prolonged or in special cases the parties may agree to pay a fee, or the AAA
may determine that payment of a fee by the parties is appropriate and may
establish a reasonable amount, taking into account the extent of service by the
Arbitrator and other relevant circumstances of the case. When neutral Arbi-
trators are to be paid, the arrangements for compensation shall be made
through the AAA and not directly between the parties and the Arbitrators.
4
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to arbitration; thus, the arbitrator's power to make a decision comes
from private contract. 26
The Association has established technical rules that cover time
limits, fees, location, evidence, and general conduct of proceed-
ings.27 The Association has also developed an Arbitrator's Code of
Ethics which serves as a guideline for the participation and conduct
of the arbitrator.28
C. Statutory Schemes and Case Law
Federal29 and state statutes30 now control and facilitate arbitra-
tions of all kinds. These include labor,31 private,32 and judicially
mandated arbitrations, 33 as well as those sponsored by organiza-
tions, 34 and those otherwise required by specific statute.35
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1982) provides: "A written agreement to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid.
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any
contract." Straus v. North Hollywood Hosp., 150 Cal. App. 2d 306, 309-10, 309 P.2d
541, 544 (1957) ("An arbitration proceeding is grounded in the mutual assent of the
disputants to the resolution of their controversy by such tribunal and the arbitrators
derive their powers from the submission agreement."). Accord Corey v. New York
Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th Cir. 1982) ("By agreement, the parties invoked
the arbitrator's independent judgment and discretion.").
27. AAA, Rules, supra note 24, No. 41, Time limit; Nos. 7, 51, Fees; No. 11,
Location; No. 31, Evidence. See also American Arbitration Association, Voluntary La-
bor Arbitration Rules (1979) (similar procedures tailored to labor arbitration).
28. American Arbitration Association, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commer-
cial Disputes (1977) [hereinafter cited as AAA, Code of Ethics].
29. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
30, CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-94 (West 1982). DOMKE, COMMERCIAL AR-
BITRATION, supra note 12, at Appendix I. (All states have enacted an arbitration stat-
ute (including District of Columbia and Puerto Rico).) Id. § 4.02. (Not all states have
enacted statutes that allow for arbitration clauses that will govern future disputes).
31. 45 U.S.C. §§ 155-59 (1982) (arbitration provisions in Railway Labor Act).
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.44, 1700.45 (West 1971) (arbitration provision for artist/
management agreements).
32. See supra note 26. Arbitration that is agreed upon between two parties not
otherwise required to do so would be considered "private." Their written agreement to
arbitrate will, however, be covered by the statute. See generally DOMKE, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 12, §§ 4.01, 4.02, 4.03. See also infra note 38 regarding com-
mon law arbitration.
33. Voluntary, as opposed to judicially mandated arbitration, as the term is used in
this Note refers to arbitration that parties agree upon either initially in their contract or
at the time of their dispute. See supra notes 26 and 32, and infra note 40 and accompa-
nying text. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10 (West 1982) is an example of a judicial
arbitration statute. Arbitration is mandated in disputes of certain types as set forth in
the statute. A trial de novo can be had at all times, even though parties have gone
through arbitration. Arbitral immunity in such a case is not the subject of this Note,
even though in certain instances an analogous situation to Baar is possible. See also
DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 12, § 1.03.
34. See Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982) (Arbitra-
tions sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange).
35. For an example see ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 12-1518 C (1982) which provides
for mandatory arbitration of public works contract disputes for less than $100,000.
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California has enacted arbitration statutes, 36 which encourage
parties to use arbitration and to find alternative methods to conven-
tional court proceedings for their conflict resolution. The statutes
provide the framework through which the arbitration agreement is
given effect.37 Although at early common law California courts
were reluctant to do so, 38 they now look with favor upon private
resolutions of disputes by enforcing contractual agreements to arbi-
trate.39 The agreemeint to arbitrate is contractual, voluntary and
private between the parties.4°
When parties agree to arbitrate either future or present contro-
versies, they give up certain civil and legal remedies which they
would ordinarily enjoy should they choose to litigate convention-
ally. An arbitrator is not bound by strict adherence to legal proce-
dure.41 He has power to decide issues of law as well as fact.42 The
36. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-96 (West 1982).
37. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (Vest 1982), see supra note 26. Lauria v. Sori-
ano, 180 Cal. App. 2d 163, 170, 4 Cal. Rptr. 328, 332 (1960). ("The purpose of the law
in recognizing arbitration agreements and in providing statutory means of enforcement
is to encourage persons to avoid delays by obtaining adjustment of their differences by
an agency of their own choosing.").
38. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. For the role of common law
arbitration in California today see 6 CAL. JUR. 3d Arbitration and Award §§ 4-6 (1980).
All agreements in writing are governed by the California Statute; however, if an agree-
ment is oral, common law rules possibly would apply; such an agreement is revocable
any time and is not binding, i.e., a trial de novo can be had after an arbitration. See
generally DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 12, § 3.02. See also Feld-
man, Arbitration Law in California, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 390-1 nn.54-58 (1957)
(There is some question whether common law arbitration still exists; but it does not
exist as to a writing).
39. Lehto v. Underground Const. Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 933, 939, 138 Cal. Rptr.
419, 422 (1977) ("The policy of the law is to favor arbitration, and every reasonable
intendment is indulged to give effect to such proceedings."). Pacific Inv. Co. v. Town-
send, 58 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489, 493 (1976) ("Arbitration is highly fa-
vored as a method of settling disputes."). Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.
App. 2d 156, 184, 260 P.2d 156, 170 (1953) ("Such statutes evidence a strong pubic
policy in favor of arbitrations, which policy has frequently been approved and enforced
by the courts.").
40. Tipton v. Systron Donner Corp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 501, 505, 160 Cal. Rptr. 303,
305 (1979) ("Arbitration. . . has been defined as a 'a voluntary procedure for settling
disputes .. ' "). See supra notes 33, 38, 39 and accompanying text.
41. Lauria v. Soriano, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 170, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 333 ("Furthermore,
arbitrators are not bound by strict adherence to legal procedure and to the rules on the
admission of evidence expected in judicial trials.").
42. Lehto v. Underground Const. Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d at 937, 138 Cal. Rptr. at
442 ("Once a valid award is made by the arbitrator it is conclusive on matters of fact
and law .... "). Marcus v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 204, 210, 141 Cal. Rptr. 890,
892 (1977) ("However, to the extent real party is maintaining that an arbitrator cannot
pass upon legal issues, as distinct from factual issues his contention is without merit.").
Compare Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d at 185, 260 P.2d at 171
("The earlier cases held that the court had the power to review errors of law." Courts
were reluctant to give up the power to review all the issues, but later cases support the
view that even if an arbitrator makes error of law an award cannot be vacated for this
reason.).
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 3, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss3/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
merits of the controversy, the nature and sufficiency of the evi-
dence, the nature and credibility of the parties and alleged errors of
law are not subject to judicial review. 43 When disgruntled parties
agree to submit their conflict to arbitration, they additionally give
up their right to a judge and a jury in exchange for swift, effective
and economical resolution of their dispute.44
The courts will construe agreements or contract clauses to arbi-
trate with every possible intention to give them effect. 45 The only
grounds for vacating an award are found in the statute46 and there
43. Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T. Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 238, 174 P.2d 441,
448 (1946) ("The form and sufficiency of the evidence, and the credibility and good
faith of the parties. . . are not matters ofjudicial review."). Id. at 233, 174 P.2d at 445
("The merits of the controversy between the parties are not subject to judicial review.").
Straus v. North Hollywood Hosp. 150 Cal. App. 2d 306, 310, 309 P.2d 541, 544 (1957)
(citing Pacific with approval). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982)
which provides:
Subject to Section 1286.4, the court shall vacate the award if the court deter-
mines that:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator:
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted;
or
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the
arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor
or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy
or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
Compare Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d at 186, 260 P.2d at 172,
where the court indicates that "in the absence of some limiting clause in the arbitration
agreement, the merits of the award, either on questions of fact or of law may not be
reviewed except as provided in the statute." Under that view it would be possible to
write into an arbitration clause a nonbinding provision, i.e., a trial on all the merits if
parties do not like the arbitrator's decision. But see Graham v. Scissor Tail, 28 Cal. 3d
807, 824, 623 P.2d 165, 175, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 614 (1981), where the California
Supreme Court, while expressly recognizing parties' right to provide "arbitral machin-
ery of their own design and composition," denies them the right to provide for non-
neutral arbitration. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. The issue does not seem
to have been expressly decided.
44. Player v. Brewster & Son, 18 Cal. App. 3d 526, 534, 96 Cal. Rptr. 149, 154
(1971) ("One of the principal purposes which arbitration proceedings accomplish is to
relieve that congestion and to obviate the delays of litigation.").
45. Pacific Inv. Co. v. Townsend, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 493,
("Courts should indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.").
46. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2, supra note 43. Canadian Indem. Co. v.
Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 2d 703, 707, 76 Cal. Rptr. 902, 904 (1969). ("The sole grounds for
vacating an arbitration award are those set forth in Code of Civil Procedure."). An
additional nonstatutory ground for vacating an award also exists in California: Impres-
sion of possible bias. This rule is based on a United States Supreme Court decision
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), in which
the court held that an actual showing of fraud, misconduct or partiality was not neces-
sary, but the failure to disclose the possibility of a partiality was in certain circum-
stances enough to vacate an award. This holding has been recognized in Fifi v. New
Hampshire Inc., 108 Cal. App. 3d 772, 166 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1980); Tipton v. Systron
7
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is a strong presumption in favor of the award when a party attempts
to have it vacated. 47
In summary, arbitration has evolved into a favored method for
resolution of conflicts especially when the parties require a swift
and economical solution;48 many of the legal niceties are bypassed
because of this ultimate goal,49 and by agreeing to arbitrate, the par-
ties accept the accompanying limitations. 50
II. ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
There has been little, if any controversy concerning the concept
of arbitral immunity until now. According to one author:
There is hardly any aspect of arbitration law and practice more
settled ... than the immunity of arbitrators from court actions
for their activities in arriving at their award. This concept is
originally based on the immunity of the judiciary in order to pre-
serve the integrity and independence of its members and protect-
ing them from harassment through court action to which they
may otherwise be exposed by a dissatisfied party.51
A. Judicial Immunity
Simply stated, judges are not held personally liable for acts, con-
duct and alleged mistakes for which a disgruntled plaintiff may try
to sue them; "the judge is not liable in damages in an action by a
litigant or private person."' 52 The United States Supreme Court
first recognized the principle of judicial immunity in Bradley v.
Fisher.53 The Court, subsequently emphatically underlined and ap-
proved the doctrine as recently as 1978 in Stump v. Sparkman,54
when it held, citing Bradley, that judges "are not liable to civil ac-
tions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of
their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly." 55
Donner Corp. 99 Cal. App. 3d 501, 160 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1979); Johnston v. Security Ins.
Co., 6 Cal. App. 3d 839, 86 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1970).
47. American & Nat'l League Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players, 59
Cal. App. 3d 493, 498, 130 Cal. Rptr. 626, 628 (1976) ("Every intendment of validity
must be given the award and doubt must be resolved in its favor.").
48. See supra note 44 and infra note 95.
49. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
50. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION, supra note 12, §§ 1.01-1.02.
51. Domke, Arbitrator's Immunity, supra note 2, at 99.
52. Wyatt v. Arnott, 7 Cal. App. 221, 227, 94 P. 86, 89 (1907).
53. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
54. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
55. 435 U.S. at 356. The Court in Bradley made the immunity applicable when a
judge acts in excess of jurisdiction, but not when he acts in absence ofjurisdiction. This
distinction had historical significance now largely obsolete. Stump v. Sparkman, re-
peated the distinction. For an especially enlightening historical analysis of judicial im-
1985]
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The test, as emphasized in Stump, is whether the act or activity
complained of, is a judicial act and, if so, is it in absence of the
judge's jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction.5 6 Since the deci-
sion in Stump seemed particularly outrageous,57 a substantial quan-
tity of critical opinion followed, opposing the Court's holding that
judges should be automatically protected for judicial acts regardless
of possible misconduct.5 8
munity see Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REv. 201
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Feinman, Suing Judges].
56. If a judge normally has the power to send someone to jail for an infraction and
he makes a mistake or deliberately sends someone to prison for a nonexistent crime this
would be construed as in excess of jurisdiction. Accordingly within the purview of the
doctrine, if he has no jurisdiction to put a person in jail, he acts in absence of
jurisdiction.
57. The judge ordered a 15-year-old semi-retarded girl to be sterilized because her
mother requested it. He failed to appoint a guardian for the girl; she was not told of the
procedure, and there was no opportunity to appeal. After she married she discovered
her sterility. She then sued the judge for damages. The district court granted immu-
nity; the court of appeals reversed, and finally, the Supreme Court reversed that deci-
sion and upheld the district court's decision of the grant of immunity.
58. Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237, 239
(1978) The next shift in the case law should be to qualify judicial immunity in civil
rights cases. Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity, 64
VA. L. REv. 833, 858 (1978) The central policy of fostering a fearless and independent
judiciary would have been far better served had the Court instead found him amenable
to suit by holding correctability on appeal to be a crucial underpinning of absolute
judicial immunity. Way, A Call for Limits to Judicial Immunity, Must Judges Be King
in Their Courts? 64 JUDICATURE 390, 399 (1981):
But there is another and more important dimension to this problem. Given
the absolute nature of the immunity, the doctrine immunizes torts which, if
committed by a government executive, would be compensable. Thus,. . . tor-
tious acts of a malicious or unreasonable nature were immunized. If the cur-
rent doctrine were qualified by either a malice standard or a negligence
standard, it seems likely that some of these cases would have gone to trial on
the merits ...
There was a time when judges were kings in their courts. But monarchs in
a democratic society are an anachronism, no matter how small their kingdom
or how rarely their subjects suffer abuse.
See also Feinman, Suing Judges, supra note 55. Note, Judicial Immunity and Judicial
Misconduct: A Proposal for Limited Liability, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 549 (1978). Recom-
mends cause of action against judges when the misconduct can be characterized as will-
ful, reckless, malicious and corrupt.
The purpose of this Note is not to criticize judicial immunity; however, it is apparent
that there is a great deal of scholarly dissatisfaction with the concept. The judiciary
seems intent on protecting itself, but indeed has narrowed other immunity concepts.
Particularly under attack is the increasingly irrelevant distinctions of "excessive juris-
diction" versus "in absence of jurisdiction." More rational and logical distinctions
might be derived from type of misconduct: for example, negligence, unreasonableness,
maliciousness or fraud. All such distinctions have their own drawbacks, however, See
Feinman, Suing Judges, supra note 55, at 261-66. It seems resaonable to assume that if
the conept of judicial immunity is softened as this author believes will happen arbitral
immunity will almost certainly be reanalyzed. Conversely, if arbitral immunity as dis-
tinct from judicial immunity is narrowed, this may eventually lead to additional reevau-
lation of judicial immunity.
In a very recent development the Supreme Court held in Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct.
1970 (1984), that a judge may be held responsible for attorney fees when a claimant
9
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Of some consequence is the fact that many of the traditional ab-
solute immunities for various agencies, executive officers, and gov-
ernment officials have slowly been eroded and have been replaced
by various good faith and reasonableness tests, thereby in effect giv-
ing qualified immunities.5 9 Additional scrutiny of both judicial and
arbitral immunity is both timely and inevitable. 60
B. Judicial Immunity Applied to Arbitrators: State Case Law
In the United States the concept of judicial or quasi-judicial im-
munity has also been extended to arbitrators. Jones v. Brown,"' is
generally credited for the first approval of the doctrine. The arbi-
trator in Jones sued for nonpayment of his fee and the defendants
counterclaimed for damages, since the arbitrator had rendered the
award without having any power to do so. The court, however,
declined to find the arbitrator liable, and, citing Bradley62 reasoned
that: "[i]t does not seem to be seriously contended that arbitrators
of matters of difference between parties do not act in judicial capac-
ity. That they are in a certain sense a court, cannot be ques-
tioned." 63 In Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien,6 an
arbitrator was sued for his alleged participation in a conspiracy with
the attorney for opposing party. The Hoosac court also declined to
find personal liability and in frequently cited language said: "An
arbitrator is a quasi-judicial officer under our laws, exercising judi-
cial functions. There is as much reason in his case for protecting
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1982) obtains injunctive relief. Though attorney's fees
are not technically damages, a small dent seems to have been made in finding judges
responsible for misconduct even though the court had upheld judicial immunity under
that statute in Pierson v. Ray, 387 U.S. 547 (1967). See Plotkin & Mazorol, Judicial
Malpractice, 20 TRIAL 24 (1984).
59. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison administrator entitled to
qualified immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors entitled to
immunity in their capacity as prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)
(school administrators entitled to qualified immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974) (state executive officials entitled to qualified immunity); Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978) (federal executive officials entitled to qualified immunity). See also
Lynch, Butz v. Economou and Federal Executive Officials' Immunity: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 281 (1982) (for a critical view of executive immunity).
60. Baar is such an example. It is predictable that more cases will follow despite
the line of cases which support immunity; eventually reevaluation takes place. See
supra note 58 and infra note 148.
61. 54 Iowa 74, 6 N.W. 140 (1880). See generally Glick, Bias, Fraud, Misconduct
and Partiality of the Arbitrator, 22 ARB. J. 161 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Glick, Bias].
62. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
63. 54 Iowa at 77, 6 N.W. at 142. The court relied for its reasoning on early cases
applying absolute judicial immunity to judges.
64. 137 Mass. 424 (1884). The arbitrator was sued because of undue influence, i.e.,
alleged conspiracy between the attorney for plaintiff and the arbitrator in favor of the
other party. The attorney was personally liable, but the arbitrator was not. It seems
possible that a penal sanction could apply. See Glick, Bias, supra note 61, at 163. See
also DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 12, § 23.01.
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and insuring his impartiality, independence and freedom from un-
due influence, as in the case of a judge or juror. '65
A few early courts followed Hoosac and Jones66 and extended
protective immunity to the arbitrator. They based their decision on
the analogous concept of quasi-judicial function and on general
public policy without employing an in-depth analysis of either the
rationale or the circumstances of the particular case.67
Much later, a New York court 68 embraced the concept of arbitral
immunity. It cited Hoosac,69 and then expressed in its own words:
Considerations of public policy are the reasons for the rule and
like other judicial officers, arbitrators must be free from fear of
reprisals by an unsuccessful litigant. They must of necessity be
uninfluenced by any fear of consequences for their acts. . . . I
see no reason to distinguish between a judge and an arbitrator in
deciding the issue herein. The analogy is clear, and considering
the favor in which arbitration is held by the courts of this state,
the same rule of immunity should apply to arbitrators as applies
to the judiciary, inasmuch as the same reasons of public policy
are applicable. If arbitrators are to be distinguished from jurists
in this respect, a blow would be dealt to the cause of arbitration
which is unwarranted. 70
Another significant group of cases grant arbitral immunity to ar-
chitects when they act in a quasi-judicial capacity as arbitrators be-
tween a contractor and an owner.71 Architects often have several
functions in construction projects. They are agents for the owner in
a supervisory capacity, they prepare plans and specifications, and
finally act as quasi-judicial officers in resolving disputes between the
owner and the contractor.72 The question in these cases is usually
65. Id. at 426.
66. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
67. Melady v. South St. Paul Live Stock Exch., 142 Minn. 194, 171 N.W. 806
(1919) (board of directors of a Live Stock Exchange organized and incorporated accord-
ing to Minnesota Statute and accorded powers to adjudicate disputes were given immu-
nity against civil suit). Hutchins v. Merrill, 109 Me. 313, 84 A. 412 (1912) (scaler of
logs was given immunity in his decisionmaking capacity). Arguably, these might not be
given arbitral immunity now; these cases seem more like an application of executive
immunity.
68. Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1956),
aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 777, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1957). In Babylon, an employer in a labor
dispute tried to vacate an award on the basis of collusion and misconduct; unable to do
so, plaintiff finally sued the arbitrator directly. The court declined to extend any alleged
liability to the arbitrator.
69. 137 Mass. 424. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
70. Babylon, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (citing Hoosac, 137 Mass. at 426).
71. E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Const. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.
1977), reh'g denied in part, 559 F.2d 268 (1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962).
72. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 Cal. App. 3d 278, 299-300, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 603, 616-17 (1977) (citing Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962)).
An architect, in his arbitral capacity, is immune from personal liability absent fraud and
[Vol. 21
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whether the architect was performing duties in his arbitration ca-
pacity. The immunity attaches strictly to his role as arbiter.73
Otherwise, the reasoning is similar to cases dealing with immunity
of other types of arbitrators. 74
C. Federal Case Law
The federal courts have also addressed the issue of arbitral immu-
nity. In Hill v. Aro Corp.,75 a 1967 labor arbitration case, the court
acknowledged the few old cases76 and one other labor arbitration
case decided by a federal court.77 As the court stated: "The history
of litigation aimed at arbitrators is easily reviewed for there are few
reported cases."'78
In Hill, the plaintiff charged the arbitrator with fraud and collu-
sion, but the court was not sympathetic to the plaintiffs theories:
1) that the arbitrator's actions were allegedly in excess of his juris-
diction; 2) that the plaintiff was a third party beneficiary to the arbi-
trator's implied contract with the Federal Mediation & Conciliation
Service; 3) that neither Congress nor the Ohio Legislature had
granted immunities, and finally; 4) that it was time for a change. 79
The court found that the strong public policy in favor of labor arbi-
tration particularly ran counter to any argument an aggrieved plain-
tiff might have in these circumstances against "the all important
labor arbitrator in the developing federal common law of labor
relations." 80
collusion. Accord Blecick v. School Dist. No. 18 of Cochise County, 2 Ariz. App. 115,
406 P.2d 750 (1965); Craviolini v. Scholer & Fuller Assoc. Architects, 89 Ariz. 24, 357
P.2d 611 (1960) (architects granted immunity for arbitral functions); Compare Wilder v.
Crook, 250 Ala. 424, 34 So. 2d 832 (1948) (an engineer accorded immunity for acts
done in his judicial capacity).
73. Huber, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 300, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 616. (The court found that
the architect was not acting in his arbitral capacity and, therefore, could be held liable.
The court indicated that immunity might be available if the architect acted in arbitral
capacity).
74. Id. "He is a quasi-judicial officer with certain immunity when he acts as arbi-
ter in resolving disputes between the owner and the contractor."
75. 263 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
76. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. Hill cites the cases cited in this
Note. See also Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962), which cites the
Federal Arbitration Statute but also seems to use Oregon Law.
77. Cahn v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 203 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa.
1962), aff'dper curiam, 311 F.2d 113 (3rd Cir. 1962) (Labor dispute where appellant
manufacturer alleged fraud and collusion against arbitrator, and also that award was
illegal. The arbitrator was granted immunity.).
78. Hill, 263 F. Supp. at 325.
79. Id. at 326.
80. Id. Labor arbitration is accorded special policy considerations. United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) "Since arbitration
of labor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary com-
mercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial
agreements has no place here." See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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Subsequent federal cases seem to affirm this position.' The only
remedy for a dissatisfied plaintiff is vacatur of the award.8 2 The
courts tend to base their decisions on prior assumption about arbi-
tral immunity rather than critical examination of underlying issues.
They usually do not attempt an in depth analysis of the various
functions and duties of an arbitrator to determine whether immu-
nity is appropriate in the particular circumstances of any given
case.
83
An exception is Corey v. New York Stock Exchange, 4 in which
the court went to some length to analyze arbitral immunity. The
plaintiff in Corey sued the New York Stock Exchange for its role in
an arbitration proceeding. The court reasoned that enough safe-
guards are built into the system; although curtailed in their legal
remedies, disgruntled plaintiffs have several avenues by which to
obtain redress.85 First, since arbitration is an adversarial process,
parties have a right to counsel, to at least limited discovery, and to
present evidence and witnesses. Second, the arbitrator deliberates
and issues a written opinion. 86 Third, there is an automatic right to
judicial review if a party is dissatisfied with the decision. Finally,
the court stated that the voluntariness of the arbitration is crucial
81. Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977). The court gave immunity to
an arbitrator in a challenge to the arbitrator's authority to solve a customer/brokerage
house dispute. Calzarano v. Liebowitz, 550 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (La-
bor arbitration: "[T]he principle. . is the same as that giving rise to the doctrine of
judicial immunity: the protection of the decisionmaking process from reprisals by dis-
satisfied litigants."). Yates v. Yellow Freight System, 501 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (Labor arbitration: "A validly appointed arbitrator is clothed with immunity
analogous to judicial immunity against actions brought by either of the parties arising
out of the performance of his duties."). Raitport v. Provident Nat. Bank, 451 F. Supp.
522 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Judicial arbitration: Arbitrator immune because he was perform-
ing quasi-judicial duties.).
See also Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Rubinstein
v. Otterbourg, 78 Misc. 2d 376, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
82. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
83. See supra notes 63-65 and 81.
84. 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982).
85. Id. at 1209, 1210.
86. The court states that the arbitrator issues an opinion. However, the arbitrator
does not have to give reasons for his opinion or award. Statutes do not usually call for
that. For example, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.4 (West 1982) which provides:
"The award shall be in writing and signed by the arbitrators concurring therein. It shall
include a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of
which is necessary in order to determine the controversy." Or see 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982)
(no mention of arbitrator finding facts and giving reasons for his award). United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheeler Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) "The federal policy
of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say
on the merits of the awards. . . . Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give
their reasons for an award." See also Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T. Ltd., 29 Cal.
2d 228, 232, 174 P.2d 441, 444 (1946) ("There is no general rule that arbitrators must
find facts or give reasons for their awards."); Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 522, 212
P.2d 233, 239 (1949) (citing Pacific with approval).
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since individuals presumably will not choose arbitration over a rem-
edy at law unless they strongly feel it to be to their advantage. 87
The court in making its decision also used what it calls a "func-
tional comparability test."88 The arbitrator functions as a judge
and, therefore, immunity attaches. "The immunity does not depend
upon the source of the decisionmaking power but rather upon the
nature of the power."8 9 Further, the Corey court found the public
policy arguments particularly compelling. Arbitrators need free-
dom to make independent judgments, and to be free from the threat
of lawsuits; it is necessary to protect the decisionmaking process
from reprisals of dissatisfied litigants. Federal policy favors arbitra-
tion, and a disgruntled plaintiff can appeal the award. An arbitra-
tor has no interest in the outcome and, therefore, should not be part
of such an action.90
III. PUBLIC POLICY
Chief Justice Burger has stressed that the overburdened legal sys-
tem needs relief. Americans increasingly turn to the courts for
whatever conflicts and disputes that they have, even though it takes
a long time to be heard or to have "your day in court." 91 In addi-
tion, litigants with greater frequency look for appellate relief if they
lose on the first ground.92
Alternative methods of dispute resolution are becoming more and
more necessary and desirable as the cost of litigation in energy, time
and money, are increasing to record levels. "The traditional litiga-
tion process has become too cumbersome, too expensive and also
87. 691 F.2d at 1210. This last argument, in particular, lacks power. Since liti-
gants assume that the process will be reasonably impartial, they rely on such presumed
reliability. The court seems to beg the issue; despite its analysis it fails to answer ade-
quately the question with which this Note deals. What should the remedy be when an
arbitrator does not behave reasonably?
88. Id. at 1209 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)) (qualified immunity
given to executive officers). See supra note 59.
89. Id. at 1211.
90. Id. See also International Union, United Auto. Workers of Am. v. Greyhound
Lines, 701 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir. 1983). The court granted arbitral immunity in a case
under Employees' Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) despite labor de-
partment regulations that arbitrators in ERISA proceedings are fiduciaries. For a cri-
tique of this labor department policy see Dobranski, The Arbitrator as a Fiduciary
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Misguided Approach,
32 AM. U.L. REv. 65 (1982).
91. Burger, Better Way, supra note 10, at 275.
92. Id. From 1940 to 1981, annual Federal District Court civil case filings in-
creased from about 35,000 to 180,000. From 1950 to 1981 annual court of appeals cases
climbed from 2,800 to 26,000. Similar increases are found in state courts. Appellate
filings increased eight times population growth and trial court filings increased double
the rate of population growth.
1985]
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burdened with many other disadvantages. '9 3 Furthermore, many
disputes may not be worth extensive litigation efforts. Arbitration,
as well as negotiation and mediation, may be adequate to deal with
many such conflicts. 94
The primary rationale for favoring and encouraging arbitration is
to facilitate easier, faster, and less expensive conflict resolution.95
Additionally, arbitration has subsidiary but important by-products;
first, the decisionmakers have particular expertise in the subject
matter of the dispute, and second, a forum is provided, which more
easily permits solutions to be tailored to individual situations be-
cause it is unfettered by precedent and legal limitations. 96
How then is this policy best implemented? The argument against
anything less than absolute arbitral immunity in this context is that
arbitrators may choose not to arbitrate if they can be held person-
ally liable and that to encourage additional litigation is directly con-
trary to the stated goals. 97 From this perspective, vacatur of an
award is a sufficient remedy. 98
However, another viewpoint is possible. If the arbitrator and ar-
bitration with its attendant procedures become insulated from all
remedies other than the most limited,99 parties may choose not to
use arbitration. If absolute immunity is applied, regardless of cir-
cumstances, the process may fail to provide what is desired and nec-
essary; namely a fair, impartial, quick and useful solution to
conflict. 10° Not only is it necessary to have free and independent
decisionmaking 0 1 it is also essential for arbitration to be fair or par-
ties in conflict will not elect to use the process. It is at this juncture
93. Id. at 277.
94. Id. See also, Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint
for the Justice System in the Twenty First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277 (1978) (recommenda-
tions by American Bar Association's task force regarding overcrowded courts and other
judicial problems); Janofsky, Reducing Court Costs and Delay, 71 ILL. B.J. 94 (1982)
(attack on delays in civil litigation with suggestions and examples of how to improve the
system); Williams, Court Delays and the High Cost of Civil Litigation: Causes, Alterna-
tives, Solutions, 71 ILL. B. 84 (1982) (a look at an alternative system in Detroit,
Mich.).
95. Lesser Towers, Inc. v. Roscoe-Ajax Const. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 675, 702, 77
Cal. Rptr. 100, 117 (1969). ("The very object of submitting matters to arbitration is to
obviate or put an end to litigation.") See supra note 44. See also supra notes 91-94 and
accompanying text. Levy v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 2d 692, 704, 104 P.2d 770, 776 (1940)
(In labor arbitration there exists another very important policy goal: labor peace.) See
also Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Federal
policy, as manifested in the Arbitration Act and case law, favors adjudication of differ-
ences by a means selected by the parties.").
96. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 12, § 2.01.
97. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
101. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 982, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836 (1983).
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and in this context that Baar v. Tigerman'0 2 must be analyzed.
IV. THE CASE: BAAR v TIGERMAN
A. Facts and Holding
In Baar, conflicting parties had contracted with the American
Arbitration Association to conduct an arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration clause in their disputed contract. When the arbitrator
failed to render an award, the unhappy participants brought a civil
suit against the arbitrator and the Association.103
Tigerman, the arbitrator, held approximately forty-three days of
evidentiary hearings and ten days of closing arguments over a four
year period. When he was not ready to make a decision thirty days
after closing briefs were filed, he and the Association received a
three month extension. l g An award, however, was still not made.
Finally, the parties pursuant to the governing statutes105 noticed an
objection to the arbitrator rendering any award; as a result, the arbi-
trator lost his authority to act. 10 6 Eventually, another arbitration
took place and there was a settlement.10 7 Subsequently, all parties
to the dispute filed the instant suit based on the failure of the first
102. 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
103. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 982 n.5, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836 n.5. Baar's complaint listed
the following causes of action: 1) breach of contract; 2) negligence; 3) breach of im-
plied covenant of good faith; 4) unjust enrichment; 5) detrimental reliance; 6) injurious
falsehood; and 7) violations of constitutional rights. Edelman, another plaintiff,
charged: 1) breach of contract; and 2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Lustbader, a third plaintiff alleged: 1) breach of contract; and 2) negligence.
104. Appellant's Brief at 4, Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr.
834 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief]. The case states that this extension
was agreed upon by the parties. Appellant Baar's brief alleges that the extension was
unilaterally granted by the Association. However, since in any event no award was ever
made, this point was moot. See AAA, Rules, supra note 24, Nos. 39 and 41 which
provide:
The award shall be made promptly by the Arbitrator and, unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, or specified by law, no later than thirty days from the
date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings have been waived, from the
date of transmiting the final statements and proofs to the Arbitrator.
The parties may modify any period of time by mutual agreement. The AAA
for good cause may extend any period of time established by these Rules, ex-
cept the time for making the award. The AAA shall notify the parties of any
such extension of time and its reason therefor.
105. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.8 (West 1982) which provides:
The award shall be made within the time fixed therefor by the agreement or, if
not so fixed, within such time as the court orders on petition of a party to the
arbitration. The parties to the arbitration may extend the time either before or
after the expiration thereof. A party to the arbitration waives the objection
that an award was not made within the time required unless he gives the arbi-
trators written notice of his objection prior to the service of a signed copy of
the award on him.
106. Id.
107. Appellant's Brief, supra note 104, at 6.
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arbitrator to make a decision and the Association's failure to prop-
erly conduct the arbitration.10 8 The plaintiffs alleged upwards to
$1,000,000 in attorneys' fees, costs and arbitration fees for the five
years. 109
The superior court judge sustained demurrers for both the arbi-
trator and the Arbitration Association on the basis of arbitral im-
munity. Although he gave some credence to plaintiff's claims and
believed the alleged misconduct sufficiently outrageous for a rem-
edy to be available, he nevertheless relied on the traditional doctrine
of judicial immunity set forth by defendants and refused to grant a
trial on the merits.' 10 Hence, plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate
court reversed. 1
The appellate court, while it did not reject arbitral immunity alto-
gether,112 found that in the specific narrow circumstance of this
case an arbitrator (and the sponsoring American Arbitration Asso-
ciation) should not automatically be permitted to invoke the doc-
trine of arbitral immunity to shield themselves from the alleged
failure to give an award. 113
The court emphasized that arbitrators have immunity in their ju-
dicial capacity," 4 and that this immunity "promotes fearless and
independent decisionmaking."" 5 However, the court also held that
the failure to make an award is distinct from the decisionmaking
process and involved no misconduct in arriving at a decision.' 16
While other courts which have grappled with the issue have usu-
108. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836. Baar and Edelman were part-
ners in the contract and in the arbitration. Appellant Lustbader was opposing party in
the original action.
109. Silverii & McCollum, Commercial Arbitration - Safeguards Needed, 4 CAL.
Bus. LAW REP. 129, 134 (1983) (Authors of this article are also the attorneys for plain-
tiff Baar).
110. Appellant's Brief, supra note 104, at 7.
111. Defendants relied on Wyatt v. Arnott, 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (1907). In
Wyatt the judge failed to make a decision after hearing the case when pursuant to an
election he moved to another county to be a judge. He was granted immunity. They
also cited Oppenheimer v. Ashburn, 173 Cal. App. 2d 624, 343 P.2d 931 (1959) (judges
are not subject to personal liability in allegedly refusing wrongfully to grant a writ of
habeas corpus). Further, Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) and Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1977) were cited to support the traditional doctrine ofjudicial
immunity. The court did not cite a California case for or against arbitral immunity; this
author's diligent search also proved futile.
112. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 982, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836. The court stated:
"Courts of this country have long recognized immunity to protect arbitrators from civil
liability for actions taken in the arbitrator's quasi-judicial capacity."
113. This Note is not specifically geared to the possible liability of the Association in
these circumstances; however, the court in Baar found that their immunity against suit
is based on the immunity of the arbitrator and, therefore, also found the Association
unprotected. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 986-87, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40.
114. Id. at 982, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836-37.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 983, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
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ally held that the arbitral and judicial functions are analogous, 11 7
the Baar court focused on the differences. It reasoned that the
functions are significantly distinguishable and do not automatically
warrant the same immunity. The court stated:
[T]he many and significant differences between judicial proceed-
ings and arbitrations dictate a different result in this case. To
begin with a judge receives power from the Constitution and the
people and judicial action has far-reaching and precedent setting
consequences. Indeed, our tripartite form of government has
given the judiciary coequal responsibility for the maintenance of
social, economic and governmental order in our society. An in-
dependent judiciary is essential to the preservation of a democ-
racy and must be protected. Judicial action therefore demands
that civil immunity be granted a judge in all aspects of
decisiomnaking. 118
Eesides the technical differences in the two procedures,11 9 the
court additionally noted that: 1) court proceedings are public in
nature in contrast to nonpublic arbitration proceedings; 2) judges
have to follow the law whereas arbitrators do not; 3) there is not
precedent setting significance to an arbitrator's award while this is
not true of a judge's decision; and 4) a judge has a duty to decide
matters before him if they are within the court's jurisdiction
whereas arbitrators can determine rights of parties, only if they by a
contractual agreement submit issues to him. The contractual rela-
tionship between the parties to an arbitration is a key feature which
differentiates the two proceedings. 120
The court stressed that the failure to render an award all together
concerned the contractual obligations of the arbitrator to the parties
involved. 121 On the one hand, the court approved (in dictum) of
judicial immunity as extended to arbitrators in a decisionmaking
capacity, but nonetheless also stated: "Bearing in mind that an ar-
bitrator is not a judge and that arbitration is not a judicial proceed-
ing. . . our decision gives credence to the complaint stating a cause
of action in breach of contract .... ",122
117. Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co., v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424, 426 (1884).
("An arbitrator is a quasi-judicial officer. . . exercising judicial functions.") Babylon
Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224 (1956), aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 77, 165
N.Y.S.2d 717 (1957). ("I see no reason to distinguish between a judge and an arbitrator
in deciding the issue herein.") See also Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 74, 6 N.W. 140 (1880),
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 12, § 23.01; Domke, Arbitrator's Immunity, supra note 2; Glick, Bias, supra
note 61, at 161-62.
118. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (footnote omitted).
119. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
120. 140 Cal. App. 2d at 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Further, see infra notes 147-48
and accompanying text.
121. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
122. Id.
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Since the arbitrator in Baar did not make a decision at all, the
parties were deprived of even the limited legal remedies for disatis-
faction with an award, if one had been rendered. 123 They could
neither accept the award nor ask for relief.124 Meanwhile, the arbi-
trator and the Association received their fees, and the parties in-
curred costs and attorney's fees. The court in Baar declined to
extend arbitral immunity in this circumstance finding that the con-
tractual agreement between the arbitrator, the Association and the
parties had been breached.125
In reaching its decision, the Baar court relied, in part, on Bever v.
Brown, 126 a follow-up case to Jones v. Brown.12 7 In Jones, the judge
had originally granted immunity to the arbitrator when he sued for
his arbitration fee and the defendant counterclaimed for damages.
In Bever, the same defendant instead of counterclaiming for dam-
ages, answered that the service he contracted for, i.e., the arbitra-
tion, was valueless to him and therefore, he should not have to pay
the fee. To this the court agreed, reasoning that there was no im-
munity for the breach of contract. 28 In effect, the court in the two
cases, granted immunity from damages, but at the same time re-
fused to force a party to pay for services that were of nonexistent
value. The court in Bever apparently recognized distinctions in the
various duties of an arbitrator and also pinpointed aspects of the
contractual relationship he had with the parties.129
The Baar court also relied on E. C. Ernst Inc. v. Manhattan Con-
struction Co. of Texas,130 which involved an architect who claimed
123. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1285-1287.6 (West 1982). These sections of the
statute provide for procedures of enforcement, vacatur (see § 1286.2, supra note 43),
and correction if necessary. Correction is based on miscalculation of figures and the
like.
124. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1283.8 (West 1982) supra note 105, § 1286.2
supra note 43, § 1285 infra note 142.
125. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 839. In one case which the
court used, Boone v. Reynolds, 1 Serg. & Rawle 231 (1814) one party did not have to
pay the arbitrator, since he was late making the award. The relevant statute provided
for this remedy.
126. 56 Iowa 565, 9 N.W. 911 (1881).
127. 54 Iowa 74, 6 N.W. 140 (1880). Curiously, Jones v. Brown is cited frequently in
this context without any mention of the follow-up companion case, which did not ex-
tend the arbitrator's immunity to the breach of contract arising out of the contractual
relationship between the parties.
128. 50 Iowa at 569, 9 N.W. at 913. ("We think that the rule of judicial immunity
goes far enough when it protects the arbitrators from an action for damages, without
allowing them compensation for an act rendered useless by their wilful misconduct.")
129. Id. at 569-70, 9 N.W. at 913 (Even though parties do not contract for perfect
judgment, they do not contract for fraudulent practices which render an award useless.
The arbitrator delegated his authority to arbitrate to someone else; this was not within
the purview of decisionmaking.)
130. 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g. denied in part, 559 F.2d 268, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1067 (1978). The Baar court did not find Ernst completely persuasive. The
holding was favorable to plaintiffs but the court felt that the Ernst court failed to distin-
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arbitral immunity for actions he took, while solving disputes be-
tween an owner and a contractor.131 In Ernst, the architect was
held liable for not making decisions quickly enough in his dealings
with the parties. The Ernst court found that since he was not acting
as an arbitrator, the arbitral immunity should not be granted. The
architect could be held liable. 132
B. Hypothetical Case
Baar represents only one factual circumstance to which the
court's reasoning is applicable. Baar arose out of a violation of
AAA Rules which provide that an award be made within thirty
days of closing briefs. 33 The Rules also impose other obliga-
tions.1 34 Consider the following hypothetical situation. Two op-
posing parties have a controversy which requires a solution. They
make a decision to arbitrate and they wish to use the American
Arbitration Association to facilitate the proceeding. An arbitrator
is selected by AAA procedure, which requires that the arbitrator
disclose all apparent conflicts of interest and permits a disqualifica-
tion based on this friction. 135 The arbitrator is told of the nature of
the dispute, he proceeds to hear the case and duly renders an
award. 136
Subsequently, the party against whom the award is made discov-
ers that the arbitrator had an obvious conflict of interest. If the
party had been apprised of this conflict, he would have objected to
guish adequately the architect's functions, making the analogy unreliable. See also,
supra note 72 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 72-73.
132. Ernst, 551 F.2d at 1033 ("Where his action, or inaction, can fairly be character-
ized as delay or failure to decide rather than timely decisionmaking (good or bad), he
loses his claim to immunity because his loses his resemblance to a judge. He has simply
defaulted on a contractual duty to both parties."). See supra notes 72-73 and accompa-
nying text.
133. AAA, Rules, supra notes 24 and 104, No. 41.
134. See generally AAA, Rules, supra note 24.
135. AAA, Rules, supra note 24, Nos. 13, 14 and 19. Rules 13 and 14 list proce-
dures required for appointment. Rule 19 provides:
A person appointed as neutral Arbitrator shall disclose to the AAA any cir-
cumstances likely to effect impartiality, including any bias or any financial or
personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relation-
ship with the parties or their counsel. Upon receipt of such information from
such Arbitrator or other source, the AAA shall communicate such informa-
tion to the parties, and, if it deems it appropriate to do so, to the Arbitrator
and others. Thereafter, the AAA shall determine whether the Arbitrator
should be disqualified and shall inform the parties of its decision, which shall
be conclusive.
136. See AAA, Code of Ethics, supra note 28, Canon II, which provides: "An arbi-
trator should disclose any interest or relationship likely to affect impartiality or which
might create an appearance of partiality." An arbitrator has a duty to disclose to the
association any possible conflicts.
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this particular arbitrator. The discovered conflict increased the
likelihood that the decision rendered would be adverse to that
party. Meanwhile, the arbitrator claims his fee. The adversely af-
fected party moves to vacate the award, his choice of grounds very
limited and the presumption in favor of such an award heavily
against him.1 37
It is scant consolation for the aggrieved party that an award has
been made. Even if he gets the award vacated, he still has to pay
the arbitrator, he has suffered time delays, and he has incurred ad-
ditional costs for litigation which could have been avoided had the
arbitrator disclosed his conflict as he had an obligation to do. 138
B. Analysis
In Baar the arbitrator supervised the arbitration proceeding; he
conducted hearings, heard testimony and evidence, yet he failed to
render a decision. Applying the test of Stump v. Sparkman, 39 the
arbitrator's activities were, arguably, within the ambit of the deci-
sionmaking process and would, therefore, be protected by the doc-
trine of immunity. It seems self-evident that by hearing the case he
is participating in a judicial act. 140 However, the parties are before
the arbitrator because of their private contract. His jurisdiction
over them and his power to hear and decide the controversy is de-
rived from the agreement,1 41 not from the traditional judicial sys-
tem. But most importantly, the parties did not receive the benefit
for which they bargained,142 i.e., an award and a solution to their
conflict. They have even been deprived of the remaining legal rem-
137. See supra note 43.
138. See AAA, Rules, supra note 24, No. 51, see supra note 25 for the text of Rule
No. 51. The parties may agree to pay the arbitrator a fee which is arranged by the
Association.
139. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
140. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. There is an argument that since
the arbitrator did not act, i.e., did not make an award he did not actually participate in a
judicial act and, therefore, the immunity should not apply. Appellant's Brief, supra
note 104, at 28-30.
141. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The court in Boar stated:
"While we must protect an arbitrator acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, we must also
uphold the contractual obligations of an arbitrator to the parties involved." An arbitra-
tor, for example, does not have power to decide any matter that is not presented to him
and he has no power over anyone that does not voluntarily submit to his authority. See
Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 473, 535 P.2d 341, 121 Cal
Rptr. 477 (1975).
142. The litigants bargained for impartial, knowledgeable and fast decisionmaking.
See supra note 44. Further, the litigants bargained for a decision that could either be
vacated or enforced. Boar, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834. See supra note
43. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1285 (West 1982) which provides: "Any party to an
arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct
or vacate the award. The petition shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitra-
tion and may name as respondents any other persons bound by the arbitration award."
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edy, either a vacatur or an enforcement of the decision. 143 Thus,
the contract which is the source of the arbitrator's power has been
breached.
In the event no timely award is made, the California arbitration
statute provides that the parties do not have to abide by a late deci-
sion, 144 but they have still spent time and expended funds in an un-
successful effort to find a solution to their conflict. The parties will
not have to participate in additional hearings in order to settle their
differences, while the arbitrator and the Association have already
received fees for services, which were of very little value to the par-
ties and even injured them. 145
In the hypothetical case in which the arbitrator failed to disclose
possible conflicts of interest, there is no act of judicial nature in his
failure to disclose; however, the lack of disclosure is a breach of the
arbitrator's contract with the Association and thereby with the par-
ties.146 This is a prearbitration matter, and it is not a judicial act
and has nothing to do with the arbitrator's jurisdiction over the par-
ties; except that he indeed was granted the power-the jurisdic-
tion-over the litigants only because he did not make the proper
disclosures.
Though an award has been made, and the arbitrator has acted
within his judicial capacity in making it, his breach of the AAA
Rules has little to do with the arbitration itself; rather it relates to
the arbitration selection process mandated by the rules and the con-
tractual agreement of the parties. A dissatisfied and harmed plain-
143. See supra notes 43 and 46 and accompanying text.
144. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.8 (West 1982), see supra note 105 for the text of
§ 1283.8.
145. It would seem that if an arbitrator performed his services adequately he would
have no trouble enforcing such an agreement. The parties, however, have to enforce
their side of the contract by using a third party beneficiary theory, since the agreement
is made through the Association in this case. See contra Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp.
324, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1967). See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. See also
Bever v. Brown, 56 Iowa 565, 569, 9 N.W. 911, 913 (1881), supra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text. In Bever the court held that the arbitrator did not deserve his fee
since his service had no value. As a matter of practical significance, arbitrators are
often paid in advance. In Baar, the arbitrator after hearing the case, prior to making
the decision, asked for and received $7,500 for future time to be spent. Appellant's
Brief, supra note 104, at 4.
146. See AAA, Rules, supra note 24, No. 19 and AAA, Code of Ethics, supra note
28, Canon II; supra note 136, See supra note 145. A very recent case raised similar
issues on appeal. Aggrieved plaintiffs, parties to an arbitration, refused to pay an arbi-
trator the remainder of his fee. The arbitrator had not disclosed facts which the plain-
tiffs felt would have precluded his choice as arbitrator. A majority of the fourth district
court of appeal found that the arbitrator had no duty to disclose the particular conflict
alleged and the court did not reach issue of immunity. A rather vigorous dissent argues
that whether the relationship requires the requisite disclosure is factual and should be
heard by a trier of fact and further would not give immunity for any breach of duty.
Rich v. Western Land & Dev. Co., 4 Civ. No. 28625 (July 2, 1984) (Wiener, J., dissent-
ing) [copy on file in the offices of California Western Law Review].
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tiff should not have to pay the arbitrator's fee in such a situation.
The Baar court likely would agree, since it determined that the nar-
row circumstance of failure to make an award is outside the deci-
sionmaking process; there is no reason to protect the arbitrator.
D. Public Policy Revisited
The Baar court explored underlying issues and problems in arbi-
tration and arbitral immunity not usually addressed. It specifically
stressed the differences rather than the similarities between the con-
ventional judicial process and arbitration.1 47 The absence of safe-
guards also is significant: 1) there is usually no public record of
proceedings as there is in court; 2) errors are not subject to cor-
rectability on appeal to the extent they are in the judicial process; 3)
there are no recorded rules of precedent; 4) the judge is far more
insulated from improper influences than is an arbitrator; and 5) an
arbitrator does not need to state reasons for his conclusions as does
a judge. 148
A system of dispute resolution with inadequate safeguards ulti-
mately may not be preferable to civil litigation.149 If a system is
devised that results in burdens to litigants, which they do not expect
and for which they have no remedy, the advantages of using the
alternative proceedings may no longer outweigh the disadvantages.
Chief Justice Burger particularly stressed voluntary and binding ar-
bitration as a viable alternative and a valuable addition to conven-
tional judicial litigation. 150 However, such a system must be
responsive to the persons who choose to use it.
The arbitrator must understand the seriousness and magnitude of
his duties and responsibilities. He must recognize that his decision
will have great impact on parties who submit a controversy to
him.151 An arbitrator who is protected not only for his decision-
making, but also for any and all acts and conduct that arise out of
147. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
148. See also, Becker, The Liability of Arbitrators: The United States, 8 INT. Bus.
LAW. 341, 343 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Becker, Liability of Arbitrators]. (The safe-
guards that apply to judges: adversary process, recorded rules of precedent, errors cor-
rectable on appeal are not applicable to arbitrators; therefore, the author believes that
arbitral immunity should be reexamined-and altered.) For a critical view of arbitra-
tion which the author believes has at times been used as social control (labor arbitration,
antitrust cases) without any of the constitutional safeguards see Kronstein, Arbitration is
Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 661 (1963). Although not primarily concerned with arbitral
immunity, the author criticizes the unbridled power inherent in decision-makers who
have few limitations on their activities.
149. It is possible to imagine a whole system of dispute resolution where the parties
pay for services, never have a chance to see a court and have very little, if any, aware-
ness of any of their legal rights.
150. Burger, Better Way, supra note 10, at 277.
151. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
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an arbitration, including his own misconduct, is more likely to be
careless or negligent. He is less likely to disclose relevant conflicts
as in the hypothetical case, or he may easily fail to make a timely
award as in Baar. Even though there are important policy goals to
the contrary,
The question must be asked whether the law should expose this
arbitrator to the risk of liability of malicious tort in the belief that
the risk will of itself inhibit this misconduct. It is no answer that
arbitration is consensual; the parties have not agreed to be
abused. I suggest that the time may not be distant when courts
in the United States will ask this question seriously and that
some will answer it affirmatively. 152
The Baar court responded affirmatively. Moreover, in Graham v.
Scissor Tail,153 the Supreme Court of California vacated an award
because one of the arbitrators was not neutral. Despite the volun-
tary agreement to the contrary, the court held that the inclusion of
a non-neutral arbitrator was an outrage to public policy. A court of
this disposition is more likely to agree that effective deterrence of
arbitral misconduct may in certain circumstances call for the pierc-
ing of traditional arbitral immunity. As the Supreme Court of the
United States in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas-
ualty Co. 154 recognized, even the appearance of partiality can jeop-
ardize the fairness of the procedure. 155
CONCLUSION
This Note has considered the important societal goals sought to
be accomplished by arbitration and has endeavored to discuss
whether these are necessarily relevant today and whether they are
best served by continued application of absolute arbitral immunity
in all matters connected with the arbitration process. 156
A California case,157 which distinguishes an arbitrator's failure to
152. Becker, Liability of Arbitrators, supra note 148, at 343.
153. Graham v. Scissor Tail, 28 Cal. 3d 807, 825, 623 P.2d 165, 176, 171 Cal. Rptr.
604, 615 (1981). Although the court found an adhesion contract present, the holding
goes beyond that. The court recognizes the statutory right of the parties to structure
their own dispute resolution machinery, but also insists citing Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976), that certain minimum levels of integrity need to be present
in order to pass judicial muster. The court called the arrangement for a partial arbitra-
tor illusory and contrary to public policy. The court vacated the award. It was not a
case of personal liability of an arbitrator.
154. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
155. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that appearance of prejudice was not desir-
able. The AAA, Code of Ethics, supra note 28, cites Commonwealth for this proposition
and Canon II appears to be written in response to the holding. See also supra note 136
and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
157. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
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render an award from his duties in his decisionmaking capacity, 153
and which also differentiates the conventional judicial setting from
the arbitration procedure, serves to point out the problems inherent
in the blind utilization of the immunity doctrine.1 59
The public policy consideration of encourageing litigants to avail
themselves of arbitration is not pertinent to the conventional judi-
cial setting.1 60 To implement this goal, it is incumbent upon its pro-
ponents to provide a system that is as impartial and fair, as it is
quick and economical.161
Clearly, a factual circumstance like the one in Baar v.
Tigerman,162 and similar to the one of the hypothetical arbitrator
with the conflict of interest, falls short of this goal. A mere vacatur
of the award 163 is an insufficient and inadequate remedy. There is
little, if any, deterrent effect upon an arbitrator if an award is va-
cated. However, a cause of action for personal liability, when there
is no adequate explanation for an arbitrator's alleged misconduct
will serve both as deterrence to the arbitrator and as compensation
to injured parties./64
Further, it is proper that an arbitrator should not get compensa-
tion for his services when he fails to dislcose obvious conflicts of
interests or fails to make an award. It will not undermine his ability
to make a decision, but will only serve to make him aware of his
responsibilities.
California, once again, is in the forefront with this inroad into
arbitral immunity. This Note has demonstrated that the benefits of
absolute immunity do not always outweigh the disadvantages.
Since implementing fair, impartial and efficient procedures in the
alternative conflict resolution setting is a primary goal,165 it is ap-
propriate that an arbitrator is held accountable when he fails to
heed his responsibilities. Baar illustrates that absolute arbitral im-
munity should not be the standard in all cases. It is time for further
158. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 104-09, 135-46 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 44, 95 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 46. See generally Feinman, Suing Judges, supra note 55. The
policy arguments relevant to judicial immunity are applicable here. However, as the
Baar court pointed out, there are significant differences that alter the basic relationship
between the parties and an arbitrator.
163. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
164. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983). See supra
notes 103 and 151 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 44, 48, 91-95 and accompanying text.
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examination. Hopefully, Baar is just the beginning of such
reevaluation.
Elvi J Olesen
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